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“Foremost among the rights Americans hold sacred is the
freedom to worship as we choose. . . . Because of the
protections guaranteed by our Constitution, each of us has
the right to practice our faith openly and as we choose.”
―President Barack Obama2
I. INTRODUCTION

William E. Newland founded Hercules Industries, Inc. (Hercules
Industries) in Denver, Colorado in 1962.3 Over the ensuing fifty years,
Hercules Industries has grown to become one of the largest manufacturers
and wholesale distributors of heating, ventilation, and air conditioning
equipment (HVAC) to contractors in the Western and Midwestern United
States, with over 250 employees at four manufacturing facilities and twelve
sales and distribution centers across Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, and
Utah.4 Despite its growth, Hercules Industries strives to “nurture and
maintain the culture of a family owned business in which [its] employees
grow financially, intellectually, emotionally and spiritually.”5 Indeed, after
all these years, it is still a family affair: the corporation is owned entirely by
four siblings – William Newland, Paul Newland, James Newland, and
Christine Ketterhagen.6 Additionally, Andrew Newland, son of founder
William Newland, is the company’s president.7 All five of the family
members with an ownership interest or leadership role in Hercules
Industries are “practicing and believing Catholic Christians” who believe the
corporation has a religious purpose.8
In April 2012, Hercules Industries filed suit in the United States
District Court for the District of Colorado challenging the Employer
Mandate that was issued by the Department of Health and Human Services
under the authority granted to it in the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act (ACA). The ACA was signed into law by President Barack
Obama on March 23, 2010,9 and was immediately met by a “political
2

Press Release, President Barack Obama, Presidential Proclamation – Religious Freedom Day (Jan.
16, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/01/16/presidential-proclamation-religiousfreedom-day.
3
About Hercules, HERCULES INDUS., INC., http://www.herculesindustries.com/about.asp (last
visited May 7, 2014).
4
Id.; see also Petitioner’s Reply In Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 18, Newland v.
Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (D. Colo. 2012) (No.1:12-cv-1123-JLK) [hereinafter Newland Reply].
5
About Hercules, HERCULES INDUS., INC., http://www.herculesindustries.com/about.asp (last
visited May 7, 2014) (quoting the last sentence of Hercules Industry’s mission statement).
6
Complaint at 5–6, Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (D. Colo. 2012) (No. 1:12-cv-1123JLK) [hereinafter Newland Complaint].
7
Id. at 6.
8
Id. at 2.
9
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol39/iss1/6

2013]

CONTRACEPTION AND CORPORATE PERSONHOOD

139

maelstrom.”10 One of its most controversial measures was the Employer
Mandate, which, among other things, requires employers to provide their
employees with insurance coverage that includes contraception and
sterilization without cost sharing.11 Hercules Industries claimed that these
requirements constitute a violation of its Free Exercise rights under the First
Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).12
The Obama Administration met Hercules Industries’ challenge with
three principal arguments. First, the Administration argued that the ACA
could not possibly burden Hercules’ Free Exercise rights because secular,
for-profit corporations cannot exercise religion.13 In making this argument,
the Administration relied on a prominent case from the early 1980s, U.S. v.
Lee, which held that owners of for-profit entities accept governmentimposed limitations on the exercise of their religious beliefs when they
incorporate for a secular purpose. 14 Additionally, the Administration argued
that even if for-profit corporations can exercise religion, the Employer
Mandate should still be enforced because it has been narrowly tailored to the
federal government’s compelling interest in promoting women’s health and
reducing the inequity in health-care costs between men and women.15
Finally, it argued that allowing Hercules Industries, and similarly situated
corporations, to opt out of the requirements of the Employer Mandate
started down a slippery slope that would “cripple the government’s ability to
solve national problems through laws of general application.”16
On July 27, 2012, the Honorable John L. Kane of the United States
District Court for the District of Colorado enjoined the Obama
Administration from enforcing the penalties provision of the ACA against
Hercules Industries.17 After considering the parties’ respective arguments,
Judge Kane concluded that the case presented questions “so serious,
10
Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Calculus of Accommodation, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1417, 1418 (2012)
(citing Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Analysis of the Obama Administration’s Updated Contraception Rule,
WASHINGTON & LEE UNIV., available at http://law.wlu.edu/faculty/facultydocuments/jost/contraception.
pdf); see also Ethan Bronner, A Flood of Suits Fights Coverage of Birth Control, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29,
2013, at A1.
11
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a) (Supp. V 2011).
12
Newland Complaint, supra note 6, at 18–20.
13
Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint
at 1–2, Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (D. Colo. 2012) (No. 1:12-cv-1123-JLK) [hereinafter
Administration’s Memo]. For the sake of simplicity, the Administration’s separate arguments against
Hercules’ First Amendment and RFRA claims have been consolidated.
14
Id. at 1 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982)).
15
Administration’s Memo, supra note 13, at 3.
16
Administration’s Memo, supra note 13, at 1.
17
Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d. 1287, 1299 (D. Colo. 2012). Judge Kane specifically
enjoined the Administration from application of 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–13(a)(4), 26 U.S.C. § 4980D, 26
U.S.C. § 4980H, and 29 U.S.C. § 1132. Id.; see also, John G. Malcolm & Dominique Ludvigson,
Hercules Halts Obamacare in Round One of Anti-Conscience Mandate Fight, THE FOUNDRY (July 29,
2012, at 8:00 AM), http://blog.heritage.org/2012/07/29/hercules-halts-obamacare-in-round-one-ofmandate-fight/. The district court’s injunction was affirmed by the Tenth Circuit. Newland v. Sebelius,
No. 12-1380, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 20223, at *13 (10th Cir. Oct. 3, 2013).
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substantial, difficult, and doubtful as to make the issue ripe for litigation and
deserving of more deliberate investigation.”18 He identified several
questions that have yet to be settled in case law:
Can a corporation exercise religion? Should a closely-held .
. . corporation owned and operated by a small group of
individuals professing adherence to uniform religious
beliefs be treated differently than a publicly held
corporation owned and operated by a group of stakeholders
with diverse religious beliefs? Is it possible to ‘pierce the
veil’ and disregard the corporate form in this context?19
Judge Kane’s questions merit a deep exploration. According to the
Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, over forty-five for-profit corporations
have filed lawsuits contesting the Employer Mandate.20 Many of these suits
have already been decided at the district and circuit court levels,21 where the
question as to whether for-profit corporations have Free Exercise rights has
been answered in at least four different ways.22 Some courts have decided
that a corporation has standing to assert its own Free Exercise rights under
the First Amendment;23 other courts have found that a corporation has
standing to assert the First Amendment rights of its owners;24 still others
have found that for-profit corporations have no Free Exercise rights;25 and
the last group of courts have declined to comment on the question, and have
18

Newland, 881 F.Supp. 2d at 1294. Judge Kane was citing Okla. ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Int'l
Registration Plan, Inc., 455 F.3d 1107, 1113 (10th Cir. 2006), which articulated the “likelihood of
success” element required for issuance of a preliminary injunction in the 10th Circuit. Id.
19
Id. at 1296.
20
HHS Mandate Information Central, BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, http://www.becket
fund.org/hhsinformationcentral (last visited May 7, 2014).
21
See John K. DiMugno, The Affordable Care Act’s Contraceptive Coverage Mandate, 35 No. 1
INS. LITIG. REP. 5 (2013); see also BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 20. As of
February 2014, the Becket Fund’s “Current Scorecard for For-Profit Cases” reported that of the forty-six
for-profit plaintiffs that have challenged the Employer Mandate, 33 have secured injunctive relief, for a
current score of 33-6. Id.
22
In fact, a fifth position has recently emerged. See Gilardi v. United States Dep’t Health and
Human Servs., 733 F.3d 1208, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 2013). The Gilardi court found no basis for the
conclusion that a secular organization can exercise religion. Id. at 1215. Nevertheless, it did find that the
owners of the corporate entities faced potential injury that was separate and distinct from that to the
corporation, and hence that the owners themselves had standing to pursue their claims. Id. at 1221.
Given the relative newness of this decision, it has not been addressed in the analysis that follows.
23
See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1120 (10th Cir. 2013); Grote v.
Sebelius, 708 F.3d 850, 853 (7th Cir. 2013); Korte v. Sebelius, No. 12-3841, 2012 WL 6757353, at *2
(7th Cir. Dec. 28, 2012); Triune Health Grp., Inc. v. United States Dep’t Health and Human Servs., 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107648, at *5–6 (N.D. Ill, Jan. 3, 2013) (finding that the Seventh Circuit’s decisions in
Korte and Grote are binding precedent).
24
E.g., Legatus v. Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d 980, 988, 999 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (citing Stormans, Inc.
v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1120 (9th Cir. 2009)) (granting an injunction for Weingartz Supply Co.);
Monaghan v. Sebelius, 916 F. Supp. 2d 802, 812 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (granting an injunction); Tyndale
House Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d 106, 130 (D.D.C. 2012) (granting an injunction).
25
E.g., Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of the United States Dep’t Health and Human
Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 383–84 (3d Cir. 2013) (affirming the district court’s denial of a preliminary
injunction); Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618, 624–25 (6th Cir. 2013) (rejecting the “pass
through” theory and finding that Autocam is not a person capable of religious exercise).
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reached a decision on other grounds.26 This divergence of treatment is
intolerable when such large classes of legal persons stand to potentially
suffer irreparable harm.27 Hence, the United States Supreme Court has
granted the petitions for writs of certiorari of two conflicting cases, and will
soon have the opportunity to clarify whether or not Free Exercise rights
extend to for-profit, secular entities.28
On the eve of oral arguments on these issues before the Court, this
article shall argue that contrary to the Obama Administration’s principal
contentions in the Hercules Industries case,29 both close corporations30 and
large, publicly-held corporations ought to be afforded Free Exercise rights.
Although it is conceivable that the ACA could be found to satisfy the Smith
standard established by the Supreme Court for violations of the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment,31 it likely cannot withstand the
heightened standard that Congress imposed upon government action through
RFRA.32

26

E.g., Annex Med., Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 13-1118, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 2497, at *5 (8th Cir.
Feb. 1, 2013) (granting a stay based on the O’Brien precedent); Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, No. 12-2673,
2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 26736, at *4–5 (6th Cir. Dec. 28, 2012) (denying an injunction but noting a
possibility of success on the merits); Sioux Chief Mfg. Co. v. Sebelius, No. 13-cv-00036-CV-W-ODS
(W.D. Mo. Feb. 28, 2013) (granting an injunction pending a decision in O’Brien or Annex Medical,
whichever comes first); Sharpe Holdings, Inc. v. United States Dep’t Health and Human Servs., No.
2:12-CV-92-DDN, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182942, at *20 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 31, 2012); Am. Pulverizer Co.
v. United States Dep’t Health and Human Servs., No. 12-3459-CV-S-RED, 2012 WL 6951316, at *3–4
(W.D. Mo. Dec. 20, 2012) (granting an injunction pending a decision on the merits; noting that the
question as to whether a corporation can exercise religion “merits ‘deliberate investigation[]’”); O'Brien
v. United States Dep’t Health and Human Servs., 894 F.Supp 2d 1149, 1168–69 (E.D. Mo. 2012) (ruling
against the plaintiff but avoiding the constitutional question) stayed by O’Brien v. United States Dep’t
Health and Human Servs., No. 12-3357, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 26633, at *4 (8th Cir. Nov. 28, 2012)
(granting a stay pending a decision on the appeal from the district court); see also Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc. v. Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. 641, 642–63 (2012) (Sotomayor, Circuit Justice) (noting a divergence in
opinion in the lower courts).
27
Korte, 2012 WL 6757353, at *5. The Supreme Court has held that any violation of First
Amendment rights “for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Id.
at *13 (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (plurality opinion)).
28
Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013). The scope of the Court’s decisions
in these cases, however, is unclear; argumentation in the briefs to date have revolved exclusively around
the RFRA issues. See, e.g., Brief for Respondents, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby, No. 13-354, available at
http://www.becketfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/No-13-354-Brief-for-Respondents.pdf
(last
visited May 7, 2014).
29
See supra notes 13–16 and accompanying text.
30
Harwell Wells, The Rise of the Close Corporation and the Making of Corporation Law, 5
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 263, 274 (2008). A “close corporation” is one in which ownership and control are
not separated, shares are not freely traded, and in which the firm’s relatively few shareholders also serve
as its directors and managers. Id.
31
See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882–83 (1990). Under the
Smith standard, courts need only give rational basis review to legislative judgments resulting in neutral
laws of general applicability. Id. In effect, the Smith case stands for the proposition that the First
Amendment itself leaves the accommodation of religious belief largely to the political process. Richard
W. Garnett & Joshua D. Dunlap, Taking Accommodation Seriously: Religious Freedom and the O Centro
Case, 2006 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 257, 259 (2006); see generally Gerard V. Bradley, Beguiled: Free
Exercise Exemptions and the Siren Song of Liberalism, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 245 (1991).
32
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2006). The Act provides that
“Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that [the
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These arguments attempt to bridge two bodies of literature that have
received much attention in recent years. On the one hand, there has been
much discussion of corporate personhood in the wake of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission in
2010.33 The focal point of most of these articles is either the potential
electoral consequences of the extension of political speech rights to
corporations under the First Amendment,34 the impact of the decision on
corporate governance law,35 or the contribution of the decision to the
academic discussion of corporate personhood.36 On the other hand, there
has been a resurgence of interest in the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses of the First Amendment in the wake of the Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission decision by the Supreme Court in 2012, affirming the
“ministerial exception,”37 and the codification of a “religious exemption” to
the ACA by the Obama Administration.38 Yet little has been published on
the implications for religious liberty of Citizens United’s confirmation that
First Amendment rights inhere in corporations.39
Part II of this paper will introduce the reader to the Employer
Mandate, identify the points of conflict between that Mandate and the forprofit corporations bringing suit, and briefly discuss the decisions that have
been handed down as of mid-2013. Part III will explore the threshold
questions: can a secular, for-profit corporation exercise religion, and does it
have Free Exercise rights to protect? Part IV will attempt to define the
specific liberty interests that constitute Free Exercise rights. Finally, Part V
burden] . . . (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive
means . . . .” Id.
33
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010).
34
See, e.g., Monica Youn, First Amendment Fault Lines and the Citizens United Decision, 5 HARV.
L. & POL’Y REV. 135, 136 (2011); Atiba R. Ellis, Citizens United and Tiered Personhood, 44 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 717, 719–20 (2011); James Bopp, Jr. et al., The Game Changer, 9 FIRST AMEND. L.
REV. 251, 256 (2010); Matthew J. Allman, Note, Swift Boat Captains of Industry for Truth, 38 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 387, 389 (2011).
35
See, e.g., Paul S. Miller, Shareholder Rights, 28 J.L. & POL. 51, 53–54 (2012); Larry E. Ribstein,
The First Amendment and Corporate Governance, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1019, 1026 (2011).
36
See, e.g., Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1629,
1630 (2011).
37
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 705 (2012). The
term “ministerial exception” is rooted in the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First
Amendment, and refers to instances in which the state is barred from interfering with the employment
relationship between a church or other religious organization and one of its ministers. Id.; see, e.g.,
Michael W. McConnell, Reflections on Hosanna-Tabor, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 821, 833 (2012).
38
45 C.F.R. § 147.131 (2012); see, e.g., Wilson, supra note 10, at 1430.
39
Of course, with dozens of cases now challenging the Employer Mandate, this is starting to change.
See, e.g., Ronald J. Colombo, The Naked Private Square, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1 (2013) (articulating a
position for religious liberty rights for corporations based on the freedom of association); Andrew B.
Kartchner, Corporate Free Exercise, 6 REGENT J. L. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2014) (surveying the
major constitutional rights the Supreme Court has applied to corporations); Mark L. Rienzi, God and the
Profits, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 59 (2013) (exploring whether religious liberty rights disappear when an
organization earns profits); Mark L. Rienzi, Unequal Treatment of Religious Exercises Under RFRA, 99
VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 10 (2013) (examining the proper conduct of RFRA’s “substantial burden”
analysis).
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will presume that under Citizens United corporations do have Free Exercise
rights, and proceed to analyze corporate Free Exercise claims under both the
standard set forth in Employment Division v. Smith and RFRA’s heightened
standard.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The ACA and the Employer Mandate
That it stands at over 900 printed pages is a testament to the
ambitious and comprehensive scope of the ACA.40 To review the law in its
entirety, or to review the multitude of criticisms leveled against it, would
require a treatise equally as long as, if not longer than, the law itself.41
Hence, this section will focus only on one of the more controversial
measures within the ACA: the so-called Employer Mandate.42
The Employer Mandate requires organizations that employ more
than fifty people, as well as organizations of any size that already provide
health insurance, to provide their employees with a minimum level of health
benefits as defined by the ACA.43 Employers who fail to provide coverage
that meets the requirements face severe financial penalties.44 For instance,
the retail chain Hobby Lobby estimated that, if it were to refuse to comply
with the requirements, it would face penalties of approximately $1.3 million
per day.45
Among the categories of health benefits that employers are required
to provide without cost sharing by employees are “preventive health
services” for infants, children, adolescents, and women. 46 The preventive
services provided for women were not itemized in the 2010 law; instead, the
law charged the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) to
40

See, e.g., 124 Stat. 119–1025.
Id. Notwithstanding the bill initiated to repeal ACA one day after its passage, the Republicans
were able to express their displeasure in two simple pages. See A Bill To Repeal the Job-Killing Health
Care Law and Health Care-Related Provisions in the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of
2010, H.R. 2, 112th Cong. (2010), available at http://rules-republicans.house.gov/Media/PDF/HR__Repeal.pdf.
42
The general title “Employer Mandate” is an amalgamation of several provisions affecting a
number of different statutes. See Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage
of Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 8725–27
(Feb. 15, 2012); 45 C.F.R. § 147 (2012).
43
26 U.S.C. § 5000A (Supp. V 2011).
44
26 U.S.C. § 4980D (2006); see also Legatus v. Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d 980, 987 n.1 (“If an
employer with at least 51 full-time employees does not offer health care coverage to its employees, then
beginning in 2014 the employer is assessed an annual penalty of $2,000 multiplied by the number of fulltime employees minus 30.”) (citing HINDA CHAIKIND & CHRIS L. PETERSON, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE, SUMMARY OF POTENTIAL EMPLOYER PENALTIES UNDER THE PATIENT PROTECTION
AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (PPACA) (2010), available at http://www.shrm.org/hrdisciplines/benefits/
documents/employerpenalties.pdf.).
45
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1285 (W.D. Okla. 2012).
46
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13 (Supp. V 2011).
41
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develop comprehensive guidelines.47 In 2011, HRSA released its guidelines
and declared that preventive services for women include “[a]ll Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) approved contraceptive methods, sterilization
procedures, and patient education and counseling for all women with
reproductive capacity.”48 Many of these FDA-approved contraceptive
methods and sterilization procedures—for example, Ulipristal (also known
as Ella), “a chemical relative to RU-486, the abortion pill”49—are opposed
by a multitude of religious denominations, including the Roman Catholic
Church.50
In response to vociferous opposition from several of these
denominations,51 and other concerned groups, the Obama Administration
issued a “religious employer exemption.”52 To qualify as a “religious
employer,” an organization must meet the following criteria:
(1) The inculcation of religious values is the purpose of the
organization.
(2) The organization primarily employs persons who share
the religious tenets of the organization.
(3) The organization serves primarily persons who share
the religious tenets of the organization.
(4) The organization is a nonprofit organization as
described in section 6033(a)(1) and section
6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986, as amended.53
In addition, the Administration instituted a temporary “safe harbor”
provision that would accomplish the dual goals of “providing contraceptive
coverage . . . to individuals who want it and accommodating non-exempted,
47

Id. HRSA, in turn, farmed the work out to a private organization, the Institute of Medicine. See
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of the United States Dep’t Health and Human Servs., 724
F.3d 377, 391 n.2 (3d Cir. 2013) (Jordan, J., dissenting).
48
Women's Preventive Services Guidelines, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES:
HEALTH RESOURCES AND SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines/ (last
visited May 7, 2014). These guidelines were based upon a report by the Institute of Medicine. See
generally COMMITTEE ON PREVENTIVE SERVICES FOR WOMEN, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CLINICAL
PREVENTIVE SERVICES FOR WOMEN: CLOSING THE GAPS (2011).
49
Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. Approves 5-Day Emergency Contraceptive, N. Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2010,
at A1.
50
Lines Crossed: Separation of Church and State. Has the Obama Administration Trampled on
Freedom of Religion and Freedom of Conscience?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t
Reform, 112th Cong. 44–45 (2012). This hearing before the House Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform, on February 16, 2012, included statements and testimony from more than a dozen
leaders from several different religions. Id. at III.
51
See, e.g., Press Release, United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, U.S. Bishops Vow to
Fight HHS Edict (Jan. 20, 2012), http://www.usccb.org/news/2012/12-012.cfm.
52
45 C.F.R. § 147.131 (2012).
53
Id. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv)(B)(1–4). This narrow definition excludes many organizations that
consider themselves “religious,” such as private elementary and high schools, hospitals and universities.
Id.; see, e.g., Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 4, Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, No.
3:12CV253, 2012 WL 1859163 (N.D. Ind. May 21, 2012).
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nonprofit organizations’ religious objections . . . .”54 The safe harbor gives
qualifying organizations an additional year to figure out how to comply with
the ACA.55 To qualify for the safe harbor, an organization must have
religious objections and meet the following criteria:
(1) The organization is organized and operates as a nonprofit entity.
(2) From February 10, 2012 onward, the group health plan
established or maintained by the organization has
consistently not provided all or the same subset of the
contraceptive coverage otherwise required [by the
ACA].
(3) The group health plan established or maintained by the
organization . . . provides to plan participants a
prescribed notice indicating that some or all
contraceptive coverage will not be provided under the
plan for the first plan year beginning on or after August
1, 2012.
(4) The organization self-certifies that it satisfies criteria 1–
3 above . . . .56
Clearly, this temporary safe harbor applies only to non-profit organizations,
and only provides these organizations an additional year to figure out how to
implement the required coverage. It does not provide a permanent
exemption.57
Hence, the limitations of both the religious exemption and the
temporary safe harbor leave many who object to the ACA—especially forprofit organizations—with only two options: violate their religious beliefs
by maintaining the preventive services coverage or incur substantial
financial penalties for violation of the law.58

54
Legatus v. Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d. 980, 986 (quoting Group Health Plans and Health Insurance
Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 8727 (Feb. 2012)).
55
CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFO. AND INS. OVERSIGHT (CCIIO), CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVICES (CMS), GUIDANCE ON THE TEMPORARY ENFORCEMENT SAFE HARBOR FOR CERTAIN
EMPLOYERS, GROUP HEALTH PLANS AND GROUP HEALTH INSURANCE ISSUERS WITH RESPECT TO THE
REQUIREMENT TO COVER CONTRACEPTIVE SERVICES WITHOUT COST SHARING UNDER SECTION 2713 OF
THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE ACT, SECTION 715(a)(1) OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME
SECURITY ACT, AND SECTION 9815(a)(1) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE 2 (June 28, 2013), available
at
http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Regulations-and-Guidance/Downloads/preventive-servicesguidance-6-28-2013.pdf.
56
Legatus, 901 F. Supp. 2d at 989 (quoting CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFO. AND INS. OVERSIGHT, supra
note 55, at 3).
57
See, e.g., James Taranto, The Weekend Interview with Timothy Dolan: When the Archbishop Met
the President, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 2012, at A11. Archbishop Timothy Dolan noted his disenchantment
with President Obama’s opposition to accommodating religious objections during their discussions. Id.
58
Id.; see also Korte v. Sebelius, No. 12-3841, 2012 WL 6757353, at *3 (7th Cir. Dec. 28, 2012).
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B. The Response from Secular, For-Profit Corporations
In general, the challenges to the ACA brought by for-profit
corporations to date59 are similar in nature, and the vast majority of them
have been brought by businesses owned by Christian men and women and
their families.60 The primary claims presented in each suit are (1) violation
of RFRA, (2) violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment,
(3) violation of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, and (4)
Violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.61 This article will focus
exclusively on the claims under the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment and RFRA.
Of the cases that have been decided, there has been a divergence of
opinion by the lower courts.62 Some courts have decided that corporations
cannot exercise religion,63 while others have decided they can. 64 Other
courts have found that corporations have standing to assert the Free Exercise
rights of its owners on a “pass-through instrumentality theory,”65 and still
more have avoided answering the question altogether, and instead reached a
decision on other grounds.66

59
Contraception Mandate Suit Dismissed in Missouri, Oct. 1, 2012, ASSOCIATED PRESS, available
at http://stlouis.cbslocal.com/2012/10/01/contraception-mandate-suit-dismissed-in-missouri.
60
See, e.g., Korte, 2012 WL 6757353, at *1; Legatus, 901 F. Supp. 2d at 986–87. The Magisterium
of the Roman Catholic Church teaches that the use of artificial contraception is a moral evil; hence
Catholics are the most likely litigants. See generally POPE PAUL VI, HUMANAE VITAE: ON THE
REGULATION OF BIRTH (1968); see also Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. 641, 642
(2012) (Sotomayor, Circuit Justice). The Green family, owners of the Hobby Lobby chain, is evangelical
Christian, not Roman Catholic. Id. The Hahn family, owners of Conestoga Wood, practices the
Mennonite religion. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of the United States Dep’t Health and
Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 381–82 (3d Cir. 2013).
61
See, e.g., Complaint at 8–10, O’Brien v. United States Dep’t Health and Human Servs., 894 F.
Supp. 2d. 1149 (E.D. Mo., Sept. 28, 2012) [hereinafter, O’Brien Complaint].
62
See, e.g., supra notes 22–24, for a brief synopsis of the cases that have been decided already.
63
See, e.g., Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp., 724 F.3d at 389.
64
See, e.g., Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1121 (10th Cir. 2013); Korte,
2012 WL 6757353, at *3–5.
65
See e.g., Legatus, 901 F. Supp. 2d at 988 (citing Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1120
(9th Cir. 2009)).
66
See, e.g., O’Brien, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 1167. However, a three-judge panel of the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals later issued a stay pending the outcome of O’Brien’s appeal. O’Brien v. United States
Dep’t Health and Human Servs., No. 12-3357, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 26633 (8th Cir. Nov. 28, 2012).
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1. Avoiding the Constitutional Question67
O’Brien Industrial Holdings, LLC (OIH) is a St. Louis-based
holding corporation for the Christy family of companies, which employs
eighty-seven employees in the businesses of mining and processing
refractory and ceramic raw materials.68 Frank R. O’Brien, the chairman of
OIH, is a practicing member of the Roman Catholic Church.69 OIH explains
the first clause of its mission—“To Make Our Labor a Pleasing Offering”—
with a reference to St. Paul’s Letter to the Ephesians.70 Hence, although it is
a secular, for-profit corporation, the OIH leadership clearly views its
corporate activity as inspired and informed by its religious commitments.
On March 15, 2012, on behalf of himself and his company, O’Brien
filed the first federal lawsuit by a for-profit corporation challenging the
Employer Mandate for violating his Free Exercise rights under the First
Amendment.71
On September 28, 2012, despite its acknowledgment that whether or
not corporations had Free Exercise rights under the First Amendment was an
important question of first impression, the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Missouri granted the Obama Administration’s motion
to dismiss O’Brien v. Sebelius for failure to state a claim.72 Rather than
address the question head-on, the Court assumed “arguendo” that
corporations can exercise religion, and proceeded to demonstrate that OIH
failed to show that the Mandate posed a “substantial” burden on its exercise
of religion. Specifically, guided by the Supreme Court’s Free Exercise
jurisprudence from Employment Division v. Smith, the Court ruled that the
ACA was “[a] neutral law of general applicability that incidentally burdens
religious exercise [and therefore] need only satisfy rational basis review . . .
67

See generally Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 1003
(1994). Professor Kloppenberg notes that the Supreme Court has provided six justifications for avoiding
constitutional questions and/or deciding them only as a last resort: the court’s “delicate” [i.e., unelected]
position, the finality of the decision, the inherent limits of the judiciary process, the importance of
constitutional adjudication, the separation of powers, and principles of federalism. Id. at 1036–65.
Ultimately, she argues that “[a]s long as judicial review does not implicate voiding legislative or
executive action, a federal court should not . . . avoid a constitutional issue . . . . [Unless] it is necessary
for a court to invalidate legislative or executive action in order to fulfill its critical function of protecting
non-majority rights . . . .” Id. at 1065. Under this analysis, it would seem that district courts avoiding the
question as to whether corporations can be said to exercise religion under the First Amendment are only
shirking their duties if they do in fact believe that corporations are being denied Constitutional rights
under the ACA regime.
68
O’BRIEN INDUS. HOLDINGS, LLC, http://www.christyco.com/About_OIH.html (last visited May 7,
2014); Susan Jones, Missouri Man is First Private Business Owner to Sue HHS Over Contraception
Mandate, CATHOLIC NEWS SERVS. (Mar. 15, 2012), available at http://cnsnews.com/news/article/
missouri-man-first-private-business-owner-sue-hhs-over-contraception-mandate.
69
Jones, supra note 68.
70
Christy Mission and Values, O’BRIEN INDUS. HOLDINGS, LLC, http://www.christyco.com/
mission_and_values_details.html (last visited May 7, 2014).
71
Jones, supra note 68.
72
O’Brien v. United States Dep’t Health and Human Servs., 894 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1158 (E.D. Mo.
2012).
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.”73 The rational basis, it concluded, was the government’s interest in
improving women’s access to healthcare and lessening the disparity between
men and women’s healthcare costs.74
2. The Pass-Through Instrumentality Theory
Weingartz Supply Co. employs approximately 170 people75 to help
sell and service outdoor power equipment at its five locations across
Southern Michigan.76 It is a closely-held secular corporation,77 and has been
family owned and operated since 1945.78 Weingartz Supply Co. does offer
employees health insurance coverage, but the coverage has been customdesigned to exclude contraception.79 The company president, Daniel
Weingartz, is a member of Legatus, a non-profit organization founded to
help business professionals “[t]o study, live and spread the Catholic faith in
[their] business, professional and personal lives.”80 Daniel Weingartz,
Weingartz Supply Co., and Legatus all moved for a preliminary injunction
to enjoin the Obama Administration from enforcing the provisions of the
ACA that would require them to provide contraception without cost sharing
to their employees.81
On October 31, 2012, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting the
Obama Administration from enforcing ACA penalties against Weingartz
Supply Co. until a decision could be reached on the merits of its
complaint.82 In considering whether a corporation has standing to assert
Free Exercise rights, the Court noted that neither the Supreme Court nor the
Sixth Circuit has ruled on the issue, but pointed to a Ninth Circuit ruling
from 2009 that presented “a strong case for standing, at least on a Stormans
pass-through instrumentality theory . . . .”83
In that case, the Ninth Circuit found a close, family-owned, forprofit corporation had standing to sue on the Free Exercise rights of its
owners because the company “is an ‘extension of the beliefs’ of the owners,
and ‘the beliefs of [the owners] are the beliefs and tenets of the

73

Id. at 1160; see also Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879–81, 890
(1990) (holding that Oregon’s prohibition of the consumption of peyote did not violate Petitioner’s Free
Exercise rights because the law was neutral and generally applicable).
74
O’Brien, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 1160–61.
75
Legatus v. Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d 980, 994 (E.D. Mich. 2012).
76
Contact Us, WEINGARTZ, http://www.weingartz.com/locations (last visited May 7, 2014).
77
Legatus, 901 F.Supp. 2d at 988.
78
About Weingartz, WEINGARTZ, http://www.weingartz.com/about (last visited May 7, 2014).
79
Legatus, 901 F. Supp. 2d at 987.
80
Id. (citing Plaintiff’s Complaint at 6, Legatus, 901 F.Supp. 2d 980). Legatus is based in Michigan
and is comprised of more than 4,000 members nationwide. Id.
81
Id. at 984–85.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 988. For a more thorough discussion of Stormans, see infra Part III.C.
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[company].’”84 Size and structure clearly mattered to the court: the
company in question was a fourth generation family-owned pharmacy that
had “no rights of its own different from or greater than its owners’ rights”
because there were no other owners of the company. 85 The company was
just the instrument of like-minded owners. Notably, the Ninth Circuit
declined in that case to decide whether a for-profit corporation could assert
its own Free Exercise rights.86 So, too, did the district court in Legatus.87
3. A “Reasonable Likelihood” That Corporations Do Have Free Exercise
Rights
Cyril and Jane Korte are 88% owners of Korte & Luitjohan
Contractors, Inc. (K&L), a construction firm with around ninety full-time
employees.88 Although most of its employees are union members with
union-sponsored health insurance, K&L does provide healthcare coverage
for its roughly twenty full-time employees that are non-union members.89 As
Roman Catholics, the Kortes strive to manage their firm in a manner
consistent with the teachings of their Church, including its teachings on
abortion and contraception.90 Hence, in August 2012, when the Kortes
discovered that the healthcare plan K&L was providing for its non-union
employees covered contraception, they sought to terminate that coverage
and substitute a new one more consistent with their faith (i.e., one which did
not cover preventive services).91 However, as the Seventh Circuit notes,
“[t]he ACA’s preventive-care provision and implementing regulations
prohibit [K&L] from doing so.”92 The Kortes filed suit on behalf of K&L
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on October 9, 2012.93
On December 28, 2012, the Seventh Circuit issued an injunction
against the Obama Administration’s enforcement of the ACA against K&L
on the ground that the company “established both a reasonable likelihood of
success on the merits [of their Free Exercise challenge to the ACA] and
84
Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F. 3d 1109, 1120 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting EEOC v. Townley Eng’g
& Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 620 (9th Cir. 1988)).
85
Stormans, 586 F.3d at 1120.
86
Id.
87
Legatus, 901 F. Supp. 2d at 988. However, this question has now been answered by the Sixth
Circuit in the negative. See Autocam v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618, 625 (6th Cir. 2013) (finding that a
corporate entity is not a “person” capable of “religious exercise”). The Sixth Circuit also rejected the
“pass-through” theory articulated in Stormans, noting that it “seems to abandon corporate law doctrine at
the point it matters most.” Id. at 624. As a separate Sixth Circuit panel put it, “adoption of [the “passthrough” argument] that [a corporation] should not be liable individually for corporate debts and wrongs,
but still should be allowed to challenge, as an individual, duties and restrictions placed upon the
corporation would undermine completely the principles upon which our nation’s corporate laws and
structures are based.” Eden Foods, Inc. v. Sebelius, 733 F.3d 626, 632 (6th Cir. 2013).
88
Korte v. Sebelius, No. 12-3841, 2012 WL 6757353, at *1 (7th Cir. Dec. 28, 2012).
89
Id.
90
Id. at *2.
91
Id. at *1.
92
Id.
93
Id. at *2.
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irreparable harm . . . .”94 In response to the Administration’s argument that
under the U.S. v. Lee decision,95 for-profit corporations give up their rights
of religious objection, the Seventh Circuit found “[t]hat the Kortes operate
their business in the corporate form is not dispositive of their claim.”96 In
particular, the court argued that because “[t]he religious liberty violation at
issue here inheres in the coerced coverage of contraception, abortifacients,
sterilization, and related services . . . not only . . . in [their] later purchase or
use . . . .”97 Favorably citing to the Citizens United decision, the Seventh
Circuit presumed that decision extended the rights of corporations to all
rights protected under the First Amendment.98
4. Free Exercise as a “Purely Personal” Right
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corporation (Conestoga) is a
manufacturer of high-quality wood cabinetry that began out of a small
garage in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, and has since grown to employ
over 950 people.99 The founder of Conestoga, Norman Hahn, and his family
own 100% of the voting shares of the company, and Norman’s son,
Anthony, presently serves as the President and CEO.100 The Conestoga
Mission Statement reflects the fact that the Hahns are practicing Mennonite
Christians,101 as does “[t]he Hahn Family Statement on the Sanctity of
Human Life.”102 The company provides its employees with a health
insurance plan that covers a number of the services required by the ACA,
but it specifically excludes coverage for abortifacients.103 On December 7,
2012, Conestoga filed suit in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to enjoin
the Obama Administration from enforcing the penalty provisions of the
ACA against it.104
The court firmly rejected the idea that a for-profit secular
94

Id.
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
Korte, 2012 WL 6757353, at *3 (citation omitted).
97
Id. (emphasis in original). But see id. at *5 (Rovner, Circuit J., dissenting).
98
Id. at *3 (citing Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)). The Tenth Circuit also reached
this conclusion. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1133 (10th Cir. 2013).
99
See About Conestoga, CONESTOGA WOOD SPECIALTIES CORP., http://www.conestogawood.com/
about-conestoga/ (last visited May 7, 2014).
100
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 917 F. Supp. 2d 394, 402 (E.D. Pa. 2013).
101
Id. The Mission Statement reads, in part: “[w]e operate in a professional environment founded
upon the highest ethical, moral, and Christian principles . . . .” Id.
102
Id. at 403.
103
Id. Unlike the plaintiffs in Korte and O’Brien, the Hahn family only disagrees with a narrow
subset of the drug and preventive services coverage required by the ACA. Conestoga Wood Specialties
Corp. v. Sec’y of the United States Dep’t Health and Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 382 (3d Cir. 2013)
(“[T]he Hahns object to [only] two drugs that must be provided . . . under the Mandate that ‘may cause
the demise of an already conceived but not yet attached human embryo.’”). In other words, the Hahns do
not object to providing coverage for contraceptives, but because they believe that life begins at
conception, they oppose any drugs or services that would cause the extinguishment of the life created
after fertilization. Id.
104
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp., 917 F. Supp. 2d at 400.
95
96
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corporation can exercise religion.105 In addressing Conestoga’s argument
that Citizens United extended all First Amendment rights to corporations,
the court remarked that it found no historical support for the proposition that
for-profit corporations possess Free Exercise rights.106 Indeed, the court
concluded that the nature, history, and purpose of the Free Exercise Clause
show that it is a “purely personal” right reserved for individual human
beings.107 Finally, the court found that Conestoga was incorporated to create
a distinct legal entity, and that it would be “entirely inconsistent” to view the
company as the alter ego of its owners.108 This decision and reasoning was
affirmed by the Third Circuit.109
As the discussion above reveals, there is a wide disparity between
the Free Exercise rights that the various lower courts have recognized to
inhere to the for-profit corporations bringing suit. Who is right? To get to
the bottom of this question, it is necessary to look first to the recent Citizens
United decision to determine precisely what First Amendment rights the
Court found to inhere to the corporation: all First Amendment rights or just
a fraction?
III. CORPORATE PERSONHOOD AND THE RIGHT TO THE FREE
EXERCISE OF RELIGION
In 1886, the Supreme Court of the United States issued its opinion
in Santa Clara Co. v. Southern Pacific Railroad, an action by Santa Clara
County to recover unpaid taxes assessed against Southern Pacific and other
railroad companies. 110 The primary focus of the decision was a series of
questions relating to whether and how to value and assess fences on the line
of the railroads running through Santa Clara County, California.111
However, one of the issues discussed at length in the briefs to the Court
from the railroads prompted the Court to include a brief headnote:
The court does not wish to hear argument on the question
whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution, which forbids a State to deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,
applies to . . . corporations. We are all of the opinion that it
does.112
105

Id. at 406–09.
Id. at 407. The Court believed Citizens United to apply only to political speech rights. Id.
107
Id. at 408.
108
Id.
109
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. United States Dep’t Health and Human Servs., No. 13-1144,
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 2706, at *6 (3d Cir. Feb. 7, 2013); Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of
the United States Dep’t Health and Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 389 (3d Cir. 2013).
110
See Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 397 (1886).
111
Id.
112
Id. at syllabus.
106
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Far from a settled issue of law up to that point, the Court’s unabashed
declaration of corporate personhood under the Constitution was “totally
without reasons or precedent[,]” leaving later courts to provide post hoc
justifications, and commentators to speculate as to what theory of corporate
personality it represented. 113
Yet despite its ambiguous foundation, Santa Clara’s establishment
of corporate personhood under the Fourteenth Amendment has had a
dramatic effect on the position and power of secular, for-profit corporations
under the law.114 Indeed, since Santa Clara, the Supreme Court has also
declared that “[t]he fundamental concept of liberty embodied in [the
Fourteenth] Amendment embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First
Amendment.”115 Thus, it would seem that, if the corporation is a person
entitled to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment, then the
corporation qua person is also entitled to the protections of the First
Amendment. As will be discussed below, this connection has been made
and reinforced in regards to the Free Speech rights of corporations
beginning with First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti116 in the mid-1970s,
and continuing through Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission in
2010.117 What is more, as the following discussion will show, that same
logic may justify corporate Free Exercise rights, as well.
A. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti
In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,118 the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to a group of national banking associations and for-profit
corporations appealing a ruling by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts that
upheld a Massachusetts law drastically limiting the ability of corporations to
make political contributions.119 The Massachusetts high court ruled that a
corporation does have First Amendment rights, but that it may allege a
violation of those rights only when the issue “materially affects a
corporation’s business property or assets.”120

113
Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 29 CORP.
PRAC. COMMENTATOR 313, 315 (1987).
114
Id. at 316 (citing Howard Jay Graham, Justice Field and the Fourteenth Amendment, 52 YALE
L.J., 851, 853 (1943)).
115
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
116
First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778–84 (1978). Indeed, Horwitz notes that
the Bellotti Court “spoke as if it were simply axiomatic that the Santa Clara case settled the view that the
free speech doctrine had been extended to corporations.” Horwitz, supra note 113, at 315.
117
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 318 (2010); see also Horwitz, supra note 113, at 315; Julie
Marie Baworowsky, Note, From Public Square to Market Square: Theoretical Foundations of First and
Fourteenth Amendment Protection of Corporate Religious Speech, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1713, 1750–
51 (2008).
118
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 772.
119
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 767–68 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 55, § 8 (West Supp. 1977)).
120
Id. at 771 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Atty. Gen., 359 N.E.2d 1262, 1270 (Mass.
1977)).

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol39/iss1/6

2013]

CONTRACEPTION AND CORPORATE PERSONHOOD

153

In reversing the ruling, the Supreme Court of United States held that
the speech affected by the Massachusetts law was in fact “at the heart of the
First Amendment’s protection[,]”121 and found no support for the
proposition that speech otherwise protected by the First Amendment loses
that protection “simply because its source is a corporation.”122 Although the
Court acknowledged the existence of “purely personal” guarantees that may
not be available to corporations, it further noted that “[w]hether or not a
particular guarantee is ‘purely personal’ . . . depends on the nature, history,
and purpose of the particular constitutional provision.”123 The Court faulted
the Supreme Court of Massachusetts’s framing of the issue:
The court below framed the principal question in this case
as whether and to what extent corporations have First
Amendment rights. We believe that the court posed the
wrong question. The Constitution often protects interests
broader than those of the party seeking their vindication . . .
The proper question therefore is not whether corporations
“have” First Amendment rights . . . Instead, the question
must be whether [the statute] abridges expression that the
First Amendment was meant to protect.124
In his concurrence, Chief Justice Burger reinforced this analysis by
concluding that “the First Amendment does not ‘belong’ to any definable
category of persons or entities: It belongs to all who exercise its
freedoms.”125
Hence, in seeking to determine whether or not the Employer
Mandate violates a corporation’s First Amendment Free Exercise rights, the
proper question to ask, per the Bellotti ruling, is whether the ACA abridges a
liberty interest that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment was
meant to protect. That is, the question cannot be answered merely on the
basis of a “person’s” corporate form, but must be assessed in terms of
whether or not the “person” may be said to exercise the protected right.
B. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce
However, over a decade after Bellotti was decided, the Supreme
Court seemed to qualify its position. In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce,126 the Court granted certiorari to the State of Michigan’s appeal
121

Id. at 776.
Id. at 784.
Id. at 778 n.14. For example, the Court notes that the privilege against compulsory selfincrimination is unavailable to corporations because the “historic function” of that guarantee has been
limited to individuals. Id.
124
Id. at 775–76.
125
Id. at 802 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
126
Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 654 (1990).
122
123
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of a Sixth Circuit ruling against a Michigan law prohibiting corporations
from using funds from the corporate treasury to support or oppose any
candidate in elections for state office.127 In its ruling, the Court recognized
that the law did burden a corporation’s freedom of expression, but that the
burden was justified by “the compelling governmental interest in preventing
corruption [by] the restriction of the influence of political war chests
funneled through the corporate form.”128 It noted that corporations were
granted special advantages from the state that allowed them to accumulate
large amounts of wealth that, if left unchecked, could permit an unfair
advantage in the political marketplace.129
In other words, Austin seemed to modify the Belloti liberty interest
inquiry with a balancing test of sorts.130 That is, at least for First
Amendment inquiries, not only must a court discern whether the statute
abridges the exercise of the corporation’s liberty interest, but it must then
balance the Free Exercise of that interest against the interests of the State in
abridging it.131
C. Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky
Although there were several First Amendment Free Speech cases
after Austin that attempted to apply the Court’s Austin decision in the area of
campaign finance, there were very few attempts to explore a corporation’s
standing to bring a suit challenging an impingement on Free Exercise.132
However, there was a case in the Ninth Circuit that seemed to pave the way
for more corporate Free Exercise claims, at least for small, family-owned or
“close” corporations.133
In Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, a small family-owned pharmacy
brought a Free Exercise challenge against a Washington state law that
required it to stock and dispense the controversial “Plan B” contraceptive.134
In considering whether the Washington law “abridge[d] [the rights] that the
First Amendment was meant to protect[,]” the Ninth Circuit reasoned that
Stormans, “a fourth-generation, family-owned business whose shareholders
and directors are made up entirely of members of the Stormans family,” did
127

Id. (citing § 54(1) of the Michigan Campaign Finance Act, 1976 Mich. Pub. Acts 388).
Id. at 659 (quoting FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 500–01
(1985)).
129
Id. (citing FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986)).
130
Id. at 660.
131
There is also some suggestion in the concurrence from Justice Brennan that the Michigan law
protected the rights of stockholders with dissenting opinions. See, e.g., id. at 673 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
132
See generally McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (regarding campaign finance).
133
Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1113–14 (9th Cir. 2009); see also McClure v. Sports &
Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844, 850 (Minn. 1985); Newland Reply, supra note 4, at 6–11.
134
Stormans, 586 F.3d at 1114–18. “After [Stormans] learned that Plan B can prevent a fertilized
egg from implanting in the uterus, and because Stormans’s owners believe life begins with fertilization,
Stormans decided that it would not sell the drug.” Id. at 1117.
128
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not present any rights different from or greater than that of its owners.135
Hence, the court concluded that the corporation had “standing to assert the
free exercise right of its owners.”136 In so doing, the Ninth Circuit held open
the possibility for “close” corporations to bring suits on behalf of their
respective owners, but the question remained as to whether this standing
extended to all corporations, particularly large, publicly held corporations.137
D. Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission
The Supreme Court issued a resounding answer to this question in
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.138 In returning to its
Bellotti reasoning, the Court affirmed that “First Amendment protection
extends to corporations[,]”139 and rejected the argument that—in the area of
political speech—corporations should be treated differently simply because
they are not “natural persons.”140 Quoting Bellotti extensively, the Court
reiterated that the proper inquiry is not who is exercising the rights, but
rather what interests are being abridged.141
Further, the Court offered flashes of insight into its thinking about
the position of corporations under the law. Whereas the Austin Court was
concerned about corporations gaining the upper hand in the political forum
from special advantages that the state itself had granted it in its formation,142
the Citizens United Court worried that Austin unreasonably disadvantaged
“certain disfavored associations of citizens – those that have taken on the
corporate form . . . .”143 Whereas Austin seemed to view the corporate form
as an artificial entity allowed or created by the state, Citizens United viewed
a corporation first and foremost as an association of individuals.144 And
perhaps more to the point, whereas the Ninth Circuit in Stormans seemed to
limit standing to sue on First Amendment rights to family-owned or “close”
corporations,145 the Citizens United Court presented a theory of “corporate
democracy” by which large, publicly-held corporations may be said to
protect the property of individual shareholders.146
135

Id. at 1120 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978)).
Id.; see EEOC v. Townley Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 620 n.15 (9th Cir. 1988).
See generally Wells, supra note 30.
138
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 342 (2010).
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id. at 347 (“Bellotti’s central principle: that the First Amendment does not allow . . . restrictions
based on a speaker’s corporate identity.”).
142
Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990).
143
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 356.
144
Id. at 353–56. The Court asserted that Austin interferes with the “open marketplace” of ideas
protected by the First Amendment by banning the political speech of millions of associations of citizens.
Id. at 354.
145
See supra note 133–37 and accompanying text.
146
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 476–77 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). This
argument by the Citizens United Court seems to be consistent with the reasoning employed by John
Norton Pomeroy in his briefs on behalf of the railroad in Santa Clara. Horwitz, supra note 113, at 319.
136
137
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E. Arguments Against Citizens United
The theory of “corporate democracy” upon which Citizens United is
premised can be challenged from two related standpoints. First, it has been
argued that for-profit corporations are highly efficient machines that have
been formed for one purpose: profit.147 As such, they are inherently and
exclusively self-interested, and, as such, may be “structurally incapable” of
acting as productive citizens of the Republic.148 Therefore, some argue that
corporations should not be afforded the same basic rights as human
beings.149
In addition, there is some question as to whether current corporate
governance law allows for the robust corporate democracy required by the
Citizens United approach.150 In particular, at least one commentator has
noted that most shareholders lack the information and power to effectively
limit the actions of corporate management, and so are generally unable to
participate in the governance of the corporation in any meaningful way.151
Hence, it may be that rather than freeing corporations to exert their First
Amendment rights, Citizens United could lead to such abuses of shareholder
rights as the Court warned against in Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC
when it reiterated that “[a]t the heart of the First Amendment lies the
principle that each person should decide for himself or herself the ideas and
beliefs deserving of expression . . . .”152
However, these criticisms fail to get at the heart of the Citizens
United conception of “corporate democracy.” That is, the Citizens United
Court argued neither that public corporations are benevolent giants, nor that
the action of corporate management represents the unanimous consent of its
shareholders. Rather, the Court reached its conclusion on the basis of
another First Amendment freedom: the freedom to associate.153 The
purchase of common stock in a corporation is, in this day and age, a pointand-click transaction, and anyone so inclined to acquire an ownership

Horwitz quotes Pomeroy: “statutes violating their prohibitions in dealing with corporations must
necessarily infringe upon the rights of natural persons. In applying and enforcing these constitutional
guarantees, corporations cannot be separated from the natural persons who compose them. . . . A State
act depriving a business corporation of its property without due process of law, does in fact deprive the
individual corporators of their property.” Id. at 319–20.
147
Kent Greenfield et al., Should Corporations Have First Amendment Rights?, 30 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 875, 883 (2007). The article is the transcript of a debate between Daniel H. Greenwood and Erik S.
Jaffe, moderated by Kent Greenfield. Id. at 875. The criticisms of corporate First Amendment rights
come from Greenwood. Id. at 893.
148
Id. at 883.
149
Id.
150
Paul S. Miller, Shareholder Rights: Citizens United and Delaware Corporate Governance Law,
28 J.L. & POL 51, 78 (2012).
151
Id. at 75–88.
152
Id. at 67 n.92 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994)).
153
See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 392 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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interest in a particular corporation may do so as long as he has the means.154
So, too, with the sale of stock: anyone who disagrees with a position taken
by corporate management may sell his shares at any time, or, in extreme
cases, pursue derivative or personal legal action against the firm in court.155
These are the organs of “corporate democracy,” and they provide sufficient
relief for a shareholder facing potential injury.156
Hence, Citizens United is able to withstand criticism,157 and the rule
holds that all forms of corporations may seek protection of their First
Amendment interests on par with the individuals that own property (i.e.,
shares) in it. That is, in any First Amendment analysis the corporation must
be treated the same as any other person.158 However, it is not yet clear
whether or not corporations possess the First Amendment right of the Free
Exercise of religion. Two key questions remain: (1) what rights or interests
does the Free Exercise Clause protect, and (2) can a corporation exercise
those interests?
IV. THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment provides that
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”159 Although this language seems
straightforward, jurists and scholars have debated for more than two
centuries about precisely which interests this clause was crafted to protect.160
Generalizing broadly, we can split the participants in this debate into two
groups: those who see the First Amendment as protecting both religious
154

How to Buy a Stock, WALL ST. J., http://guides.wsj.com/personal-finance/investing/how-to-buy-astock (last visited May 7, 2014).
155
Id.; see also Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 534–35 (1970). The shareholder derivative action
originated as an equitable action permitting stockholders to hold corporate managers accountable. Ross,
396 U.S. at 534–35. “As elaborated in the cases, one precondition for the suit was a valid claim on
which the corporation could have sued; another was that the corporation itself had refused to proceed
after suitable demand, unless excused by extraordinary conditions.” Id. at 534 (citation omitted).
156
For example, at least two courts have examined the impact of the shareholder standing rule on the
Employer Mandate controversy. That rule is “a longstanding equitable restriction that generally prohibits
shareholders from initiating actions to enforce the rights of the corporation unless the corporation's
management has refused to pursue the same action for reasons other than good-faith business judgment.”
Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Alcan Aluminum Ltd., 493 U.S. 331, 336 (1990). The Sixth Circuit has
held that the shareholder standing rule prevents the owners of a corporation from bringing a RFRA claim
arising from a legal obligation of that corporation. Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618, 622 (6th
Cir. 2013). The D.C. Circuit held that the shareholder standing rule did not. Gilardi v. United States
Dep’t Health and Human Servs., 733 F.3d 1208, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Yet neither has questioned
whether shareholders may take action against the corporation itself had they been wronged.
157
There is one additional criticism not pointed out in the discussion in the preceding paragraphs:
given the issues in the case, and the precedents that the Court relied upon, in future decisions the
Supreme Court may decide that the First Amendment rights attributed to corporations in Citizens United
are limited exclusively to political speech. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 341.
158
First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 802 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (“[T]he
First Amendment does not ‘belong’ to any definable category of persons or entities: It belongs to all who
exercise its freedoms.”).
159
U.S. CONST., amend. I.
160
See, e.g., Garnett & Dunlap, supra note 31, at 259–61.
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belief and conduct, and those who see the First Amendment as protecting
only belief.161
Although the Supreme Court seemed to see the Free Exercise
Clause as protecting interests—including both belief and conduct—from the
early 1960s through the late 1980s, the Court’s 1990 decision in
Employment Division v. Smith signaled a shift to the protection of only
religious belief.162 Congress responded by reinstating a heightened standard
in RFRA,163 but the debate persists as to the nature and scope of Free
Exercise rights.164 As a necessary step in determining whether or not the
Employer Mandate violates the interests that the Free Exercise Clause
protects, one must first establish whether or not the corporate entity can
truly “exercise religion.” This section will revisit the developments in Free
Exercise law over the last fifty years, and explore the jurisprudence
underlying the two main positions in the Free Exercise debate to
demonstrate that a corporation does indeed have protectable interests under
the Free Exercise Clause.
A. The Sherbert Balancing Test
In the 1963 case of Sherbert v. Verner, the Court considered a claim
by Adell Sherbert that the state of South Carolina abridged her First
Amendment Free Exercise rights by denying her unemployment benefits.165
Ms. Sherbert, a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, had her
employment terminated because she would not work on Saturdays, the
Sabbath Day for Seventh-day Adventists.166 When she applied for
unemployment benefits, her claim was denied because, under the law she
“failed, without good cause . . . to accept available suitable work when
offered . . . .”167
In finding for Ms. Sherbert, the Court employed a two-part test that
asked, first, whether the law imposed a substantial burden upon the Free
Exercise of the appellant’s religion and, second, if it did, whether that
substantial burden was justified by a compelling state interest.168 As it
pertained to Ms. Sherbert, the Court found that “to condition the availability
161
Vincent Phillip Munoz, The Original Meaning of the Free Exercise Clause: The Evidence from
the First Congress, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1083, 1083–84 (2008).
162
Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877–88 (1990); see also City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 548 (1997) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“I believe that, in light of both our
precedent and our Nation’s tradition of religious liberty, Smith is demonstrably wrong.”).
163
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103–141, 107 Stat. 1488.
164
See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 699
(2012).
165
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399–400 (1963).
166
Id. at 399.
167
Id. at 401.
168
Id. at 403, 406. Notably, although Justice Brennan uses citations quite liberally throughout his
opinion, there are no citations in direct support of his use of this test in this particular case.
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of benefits upon [Sherbert’s] willingness to violate a cardinal principle of
her religious faith effectively penalizes the free exercise of her constitutional
liberties[,]”169 and therefore rejected the state’s argument that fear of
fraudulent claims diluting the unemployment fund justified the burden.170
Over the ensuing thirty years, the Court employed the Sherbert test
a number of times to balance an individual’s Free Exercise rights against
state action. On the one hand, the Court acted to protect an individual’s
Free Exercise rights by upholding an Amish family’s decision not to send its
children to school after the eighth grade,171 and by requiring the provision of
state unemployment benefits to an individual who resigned from his factory
position because his religious beliefs would not allow him to produce or
directly aid in the manufacture of items used in warfare.172
However, on the other hand, the Court also showed that the Sherbert
test was not an absolute guarantee for the individual. On at least two
occasions, the Court found that the government’s interest outweighed the
burden on the individual’s Free Exercise rights.173 Most notably, in
rejecting an Amish employer’s attempt to opt out of Social Security tax
payments on religious grounds, the Court wrote that “[w]hen followers of a
particular sect enter into commercial activity as a matter of choice, the limits
they accept on their own conduct as a matter of conscience and faith are not
to be superimposed on the statutory schemes which are binding on others in
that activity.”174

169

Id. at 406.
Id. at 407–09. In a decision just two years prior to Sherbert, the Supreme Court upheld a Sundayclosing law that advanced the purported state interest of providing a uniform day of rest. Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 600–601 (1961)). In that case, the Court found that the burden this placed on
observers of a Saturday Sabbath was justified. Id. at 607.
171
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 211 (1972). The Court recognized that First Amendment Free
Exercise rights are not absolute when it noted that the “activities of individuals, even when religiously
based, are often subject to regulation by the States . . . or the Federal Government . . . .” Id. at 220. Yet it
found that the Wisconsin act in question, “unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.” Id. at 232–33 (quoting
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 US. 510, 534–35 (1925)).
172
Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 719 (1981). In Thomas, the Court
provided a glimpse into its understanding of the scope of “religion” in the Free Exercise Clause: “[T]he
guarantee of free exercise is not limited to beliefs which are shared by all of the members of a religious
sect. . . . [I]t is not within the . . . judicial competence to inquire whether the petitioner . . . correctly
perceived the commands of their common faith. Courts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation.” Id.
at 715–16.
173
See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261; Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 712 (1986). In Bowen,
Native American parents refused to register their daughter for a Social Security number on the ground
that, according to their religion, such action would tarnish the purity of her spirit. Id. at 695. The Court
found for the government because “[t]he requirement that applicants provide a Social Security number is
facially neutral and applies to all applicants for the benefits involved.” Id. at 708.
174
Lee, 455 U.S. at 261. The Court distinguished from the situation presented in Yoder on the
grounds that Lee was taking on the Social Security system, an entity that the government could not afford
to have jeopardized. Id. at 259–60. The Obama Administration relies heavily on the Lee opinion in its
briefs, and many courts find the argument persuasive. See, e.g., Grote v. Sebelius, 708 F.3d 850, 859 (7th
Cir. 2013) (Rovner, Circuit J., dissenting); Administration’s Memo, supra note 13, at 1–2.
170
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B. Smith: The End of the Balancing Test
The majority ruling in Employment Division v. Smith, in 1990,
drastically limited the scope of Sherbert, and effectively overruled the
thirty-year old balancing test.175 The primary issue in Smith was whether or
not the Free Exercise Clause required that a state exempt individuals from a
criminal statute outlawing the ingestion of peyote, when those individuals
ingested peyote as part of a Native American sacramental right.176 The
Court held that it did not. Regardless of the burden imposed by the state on
religious belief, the Court wrote, “the right of free exercise does not relieve
an individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of
general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes)
conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).’”177
The Smith Court did concede that “the ‘exercise of religion’ often
involves not only belief and profession but the performance of (or abstention
from) physical acts[]” such as worship assemblies, participation in physical
sacraments, proselytizing, and more.178 But it concluded that the only
constitutionally-protected dimension of the Free Exercise of religion is “the
right to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires.”179
Although states certainly can choose to make certain religious exemptions,
such as the sacramental use of peyote, the Court insisted that the Free
Exercise Clause did not require that it do so.180 For the Court to mandate
exemptions in such cases would “permit every citizen to become a law unto
himself.”181
The Court did not directly overrule the Sherbert balancing test, but
it declared that the test was useful only in situations dealing with issues like
unemployment compensation, which lend themselves to individualized
government assessment.182 Such cases “have nothing to do with an acrossthe-board criminal prohibition on a particular form of conduct[,]”183 the
Court reasoned, noting that although the balancing test had been used to
challenge across-the-board laws, it had never invalidated one.184 Rather
than continue with the perilous—and subjective—process of weighing the
175
Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884–85 (1990) (“Although . . .
we have sometimes used the Sherbert test to analyze free exercise challenges to [across-the-board
criminal prohibitions on conduct] . . . we have never applied the test to invalidate one.”).
176
Id. at 874.
177
Id. at 879 (quoting Lee, 455 U.S. at 263 n.3 (Sevens, J., concurring)).
178
Id. at 877.
179
Id.
180
Id. at 889.
181
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878). Reynolds is the well-known “polygamy
case,” in which the Supreme Court affirmed the government’s right to outlaw polygamy despite
Reynolds’s assertion that his Mormon faith demanded that he take more than one wife. Id. at 167–68.
182
Smith, 494 U.S. at 884 (citing Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986)). Ironically, Smith was an
unemployment compensation case, too. Id. at 874.
183
Id. at 884.
184
Id. at 883.
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pros and the cons, the Smith majority sought to establish a clear test that
could be applied with some degree of objectivity.185 In a telling remark, the
majority noted that “it is horrible to contemplate that [were a Sherbert
regime to persist] federal judges will regularly balance against the
importance of general laws the significance of religious practice.”186 The
majority clearly felt the Court was ill-suited for such a task.187
Hence, although Smith may not have explicitly overruled Sherbert,
it did radically change the Court’s approach to Free Exercise cases and
effectively ended the Court’s use of a balancing test.188 The judicial
approach to be employed heretofore would be to eschew exemptions and
support “[t]he government’s ability to enforce generally applicable
prohibitions of socially harmful conduct . . . .”189 Or, as the Court succinctly
summarized it in the first big Free Exercise case after Smith, “a law that is
neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling
governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a
particular religious practice.”190
Later, Justice Antonin Scalia, the author of the Court’s Smith
opinion, summarized the historical, jurisprudential, and philosophical
underpinnings of the Smith approach.191 Responding directly to Justice
O’Connor’s defense of the Sherbert test in her dissent in City of Boerne v.
Flores,192 Justice Scalia argued that the historical evidence that Justice
O’Connor “claims is at odds with Smith either has little to say about the
issue or is in fact more consistent with Smith than with the dissent’s
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause.”193 Although he admits that
O’Connor’s evidence cannot fairly be said to prove Smith is the Free
Exercise approach most consistent with the Founders’ views, he believes the
evidence to be more supportive of the Smith standard than contrary to it.194
Scalia’s conclusion is essential to an understanding of the Smith standard:
The [Sherbert balancing test] has, of course, great popular
attraction. Who can possibly be against the abstract
proposition that government should not, even in its general,
185
See generally Gerard V. Bradley, Beguilded: Free Exercise Exemptions and the Siren Song of
Liberalism, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 245 (1991).
186
Smith, 494 U.S. at 889 n.5.
187
See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981).
188
See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531–32
(1993).
189
Smith, 494 U.S. at 885.
190
Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 531.
191
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 537–44 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
192
Id. at 537. Justice O’Connor did not believe Smith to be a rightly-reasoned opinion but she did
agree that the Oregon state law ought to be upheld; she believed that Oregon showed a compelling state
interest to justify its burden under the Sherbert test. Smith, 494 U.S. at 891–907 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
193
See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 537.
194
Id. at 544.
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nondiscriminatory laws, place unreasonable burdens upon
religious practice? Unfortunately, however, that abstract
proposition must ultimately be reduced to concrete cases.
The issue presented . . . is . . . whether the people, through
their elected representatives, or rather this Court, shall
control the outcome of those concrete cases. . . . Smith
[says] [i]t shall be the people.195
In other words, the Smith approach rests upon a separation of
powers argument. It contemplates only a limited role for the judiciary at the
nebulous intersection of law and religious belief because, it is believed, the
Founders did not contemplate a judicial power to exempt individuals from
these laws, only a legislative power.196 It belongs to the popularly elected
legislatures to make any difficult tradeoffs that must be made, because
legislators are accountable to the people through democratic elections in
which the people can voice their agreement or disagreement with decisions
made.197 Hence, the Smith Court concluded that the Free Exercise Clause
protects an individual’s freedom of belief, but it does not afford a complete
freedom to act in any manner that an individual may deem consistent with
his beliefs. When it comes to conduct, the Free Exercise Clause affords
legislatures the latitude to regulate activity in the interest of the common
good as it sees fit, provided the legislature stays within Constitutional
bounds in other regards.198
C. RFRA: “The People” Respond
Congress reacted to the Smith decision by passing RFRA “to restore
the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner . . . .”199 In
response to the Smith Court’s express distaste for implementing a balancing
test to protect Free Exercise,200 Congress asserted that Sherbert “is a
workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and
competing prior governmental interests.”201 In City of Boerne v. Flores a
few years later, the Court found RFRA to exceed Congressional power
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as it applied to local and state
governments.202 However, RFRA continues to apply to action of the Federal

195

Id.
Munoz, supra note 161, at 1096.
197
See generally Bradley, supra note 185.
198
See Munoz, supra note 161 at 1096.
199
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103–141, § 2(b)(1), 107 Stat. 1488,
1488; see also Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 (2006)
(discussing the congressional response to Smith).
200
See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
201
§ 2(a)(5), 107 Stat. at 1488.
202
Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1656 (2011) (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,
536 (1997)).
196
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Government.203
In her dissent in Boerne, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor summarized
the historical, jurisprudential, and philosophical underpinnings of the
Sherbert test now embodied in RFRA.204 O’Connor examined four types of
historical sources—early documents, early state constitutions, the practices
of the Colonies and early states, and the writings of the Founders—from
which she culled three general principles:
Foremost, these early leaders accorded religious exercise a
special constitutional status. . . .
Second, all agreed that government interference in
religious practice was not to be lightly countenanced.
Finally, all shared the conviction that “true religion and
good morals are the only solid foundation of public liberty
and happiness.”205
In short, O’Connor argued that the Founders viewed the Free
Exercise Clause as a guarantee that government would not come between
believers and the free practice of their religion, and therefore envisioned a
balancing test that would give judges the authority to exempt individuals
from generally applicable laws that burdened their religious conduct.206
D. Can Corporations Exercise Religion?
The apparent conflict between the Supreme Court and Congress, in
understanding the Free Exercise Clause, may appear to create competing
standards under which to determine whether or not a corporation can
exercise religion. In fact, however, the Smith decision and RFRA work
hand in hand. As Garnett and Dunlap point out, “[t]he Smith case teaches
clearly that the political process is the main arena, and politically
accountable actors are the primary players, when it comes to
accommodating the special needs of religious believers.”207 With RFRA,
the political arena and the politically accountable actors provided those
203

Id.
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 544–66 (1997) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). O’Connor
wrote: “I examine here the early American tradition of religious free exercise to gain insight into the
original understanding of the Free Exercise Clause – an inquiry the Court in Smith did not undertake.” Id.
at 548.
205
Id. at 563–64 (citations omitted). Examples of the early sources surveyed include: the Maryland
Assembly’s “Act Concerning Religion” from 1649, Rhode Island’s Charter of 1663, and “[v]arious
agreements between prospective settlers and the proprietors of Carolina, New York, and New Jersey.” Id.
at 551–52. Examples of early state constitutions include: New York, New Hampshire, Maryland, and
Georgia. Id. at 552–55. Examples of early practices include those dealing with Quakers and others on,
among other things, the issues of oaths and military conscription. Id. at 557–60. Examples of Founders
consulted include: James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, and George Washington. Id. at 560–63.
206
Munoz, supra note 161, at 1088–90 (citing Boerne, 521 U.S. at 544–65 (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting)).
207
Garnett & Dunlap, supra note 31, at 259.
204
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accommodations in the form of a heightened standard of scrutiny of
government action that substantially burdens religious belief.208
The first step in deciding whether corporations have Free Exercise
rights, then, is to ask: can corporations hold a “religious belief?” Answering
this question requires the application of the plain meaning rule, which
requires an inquiry into the plain meaning that the ordinary speaker of the
English language would draw from a given term.209 The interpreter may
turn to a dictionary or other language in the statute for help in discerning the
plain meaning, but ultimately the test is simple: “could [a person] use the
word in that sense at a cocktail party without having people look at [him]
funny?”210
Merriam Webster’s dictionary defines “belief” as a “conviction of
the truth of some statement or the reality of some being or phenomenon . . .
.”211 And, in an oft-cited passage in Free Exercise and Establishment Clause
cases, James Madison defined religion as “the duty which we owe to our
Creator and the Manner of discharging it . . . .”212 Hence, using the plain
meaning rule, “religious belief” can be roughly defined as “the conviction of
the truth of the duty we owe our creator, and the manner of discharging it.”
Presenting fellow guests at a cocktail party with this definition would not
likely evoke funny looks in response.
So, can a corporation hold a conviction of the truth of the duty we
owe our Creator, and the manner of discharging it? Just ask the dozens of
corporations who are presently challenging the Employer Mandate because
the provision of contraception to its employees flies in the face of its
religious beliefs.213 One plaintiff argues that to contend that corporations
cannot hold such a conviction “would prevent businesses from operating
according to any kind of ethical norm, charitable effort, stewardship of
nature, or just plain honesty, on the basis that its profit motive is
‘overriding.’ The First Amendment has never excluded religion from
business.”214
Put another way, if a corporation of any kind can hold and express a
political conviction under Citizens United, there is no logical barrier to
adopting and holding convictions that relate to the duty owed to the Creator.
208
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Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103–141, § 3(b), 107 Stat. 1488, 1488–
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See, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 697 (1995).
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 230
(2012) (citing Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 594, 718 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
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Belief – Definition and More from the Free Merriam-Webster Dictionary, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
http://merriam-webster.com/dictionary/belief (last visited May 7, 2014).
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James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, reprinted in
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 64 (1947).
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See, e.g., God and the Profits, supra note 39; see also supra notes 22–26.
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Newland Reply, supra note 4, at 8 (footnote omitted).
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This argument applies equally to “close” and publicly-held
corporations.216
V. DOES THE EMPLOYER MANDATE VIOLATE AN UNWILLING
CORPORATION’S FREE EXERCISE RIGHTS?
If a corporation can indeed exercise religion, then Citizens United—
indeed, the Constitution—requires that they be extended the Free Exercise
protections originating in the First Amendment and reinforced by RFRA.217
This section will apply the appropriate analyses to the Employer Mandate to
show that although the ACA likely holds up under the Smith standard
established for the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment,218 it likely
will not withstand the heightened scrutiny of RFRA.219
A. Applying the Smith Standard
A case decided just a few short years after Smith, Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah220 provides an excellent
blueprint for applying Smith’s standard of neutrality and general
applicability.221 Although an analysis under the Smith/Hialeah standard
suggests that the ACA may withstand the First Amendment challenges,
there are at least three points of weakness that merit further exploration.
In Hialeah, the Court examined a series of ordinances of the City of
Hialeah, Florida, that—given both their legislative history and their narrow
focus—were very obviously designed to prohibit a religious group from
conducting animal sacrifices consistent with the Santeria religion.222 In
striking down the ordinances, the Court employed a very simple two-part
test. First, the Court considered the neutrality of the law by looking at both
215

See supra Part III for a discussion of the Citizens United decision. This position is also supported
by the Tenth Circuit’s conclusion that the plain language of RFRA suggests that “corporations” are to be
treated as persons with the capacity to exercise religion. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d
1114, 1133 (10th Cir. 2013).
216
Id. at 1128.
217
See infra Parts III and IV for arguments supporting this assertion.
218
See generally Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
219
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103–141, § 6(b), 107 Stat. 1488, 1489.
RFRA provides that “Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it
demonstrates that [the burden] . . . (1) is in furtherance of a compelling government interest; and (2) is
the least restrictive means . . . .” Id. § 3(b), 107 Stat. 1488, 1488–49.
220
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 520 (1993).
221
Id. at 531–32.
222
Id. at 524–30. There were a number of facts that made it fairly clear the city was targeting the
adherents of Santeria: upon learning of plans for a house of worship, school and museum for the Santeria
religion in Hialeah, the city council held an emergency session and passed an ordinance adopting a state
law and subjecting to criminal punishment any person who unnecessarily kills any animal. Id. at 526.
The Hialeah city attorney then contacted the State attorney general to ensure that the state law it had
adopted in its ordinance included animal sacrifice such as that performed in Santeria. Id. at 527. Upon
receiving confirmation that animal sacrifice was included, the city issued a resolution noting the great
concern of its residents about animal sacrifice. Id. And soon thereafter it passed three ordinances that
prohibited religious animal sacrifice. Id. at 527–28.
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the text of the law223 and the law’s operation.224 Although the text of the
Hialeah ordinance was facially neutral, the Court found that the effect was
under-inclusive because it subjected an arbitrarily narrow class of persons to
criminal penalties, and over-inclusive because it prohibited conduct that
went well beyond what was necessary to achieve the stated intent of the
law.225
Second, the Court examined whether or not the law was generally
applicable by employing a “selective manner” analysis.226 A law fails the
“selective manner” analysis if it “in a selective manner impose[s] burdens
only on conduct motivated by religious belief . . . .”227 The Hialeah
ordinance clearly was not generally applicable in practice; as the Court
noted, “it was religion, and religion alone, that bore the burden of the
ordinances . . . .”228
The ACA is not as overtly discriminatory as the Hialeah ordinances,
and therefore has a stronger chance to pass the Smith test as it was applied in
Hialeah. To be sure, compelling for-profit employers to provide no-cost
contraception coverage to their employees over their religious objections
does qualify as a burden on the employers’ exercise of religion.229
However, it can be argued that the Employer Mandate is both facially
neutral, and neutral in operation. The text of the Employer Mandate does
not single out those who believe that contraception is immoral, but rather
applies to all employers with over fifty employees and to all smaller
employers offering healthcare coverage at the time of the law’s passage.230
Further, the law is neutral in operation in that it is neither under-inclusive
nor over-inclusive. Both in word and in effect, the Employer Mandate
penalizes any employer who does not provide coverage in accordance with
the plan’s requirements, whether or not that employer has religious
objections.231
Moreover, arguably the law does not impose the burden in a
selective manner. A law applies selectively if it burdens only conduct
motivated by religious belief. Yet the Employer Mandate burdens the
conduct of all employers that meet the size qualifications, not merely the
employers who meet the size qualifications that believe contraception is
wrong.232 Indeed, if there can be any degree of selectivity, it could be said
223

Id. at 533. This analysis is often referred to as “facial neutrality.” Id.
Id. at 535. This analysis is often referred to as “neutrality in effect.” See id. at 533–34.
225
Id. at 579 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
226
Id. at 543.
227
Id.
228
Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1134 (9th Cir. 2009), commenting on Hialeah, 508 U.S.
at 543–46.
229
See, e.g., Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 712 (1986).
230
26 U.S.C. § 4980H (Supp. V 2011).
231
Id.
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that it applies selectively to those organizations that do not have a religious
objection, as there is a defined process enabling qualified organizations to
obtain a religious exemption.233
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, given the separation of
powers argument at the heart of Smith, the ACA was passed by two
legislative chambers with members elected every two years and every six
years, respectively, and with rules imposed by an Executive Branch subject
to election every four years.234 That is, to the extent provided under the
Constitution, it was “the people” who decided.
B. Hang-ups Under the Smith Standard
However, Hialeah was an easy case,235 and at least one
commentator has noted that the ease with which the Court found the City of
Hialeah’s laws to be unconstitutional using the Smith framework has led
many to the “incorrect, or at least incomplete” conclusion that neutral and
generally applicable laws are completely immune from Free Exercise
attack.236 Indeed, there are three issues that one might raise in relation to the
ACA’s Employer Mandate: (1) it can be argued that the law is underinclusive in that it seeks to penalize only for-profit corporations that refuse
to comply; (2) the Employer Mandate actually emanates from an executive
agency and not a popularly elected body, as Justice Scalia in Boerne
suggests it must; and (3) it is not clear whether there is a distinction under
Smith between laws that restrict a person’s religious conduct, and laws that
coerce a person to violate his religious beliefs.
1. The Profit-Making Motive: A Questionable Distinction
Arguably, “the Supreme Court has already recognized that profitseekers have a right to the free exercise of religion.”237 Decisions such as
Braunfeld v. Brown and U.S. v. Lee acknowledge that “those who engage in
profit-making enterprises can still have religious convictions that require
them to do or refrain from doing certain things in their businesses.”238
233
Id. § 5000A(d)(2); see also 45 CFR § 147 (2012). See supra note 53 and accompanying text for
the religious exemption requirements.
234
Although the issue is beyond the scope of this article, it is altogether another question as to
whether the rules promulgated by the Obama Administration and the Department of Health and Human
Services followed valid procedure. See generally, e.g., O’Brien Complaint, supra note 61 and
accompanying text. Indeed, nearly all Free Exercise challenges filed against the Employer Mandate have
included allegations of violation of the Administrative Procedures Act. Id. at 10.
235
For a discussion of facts of Hialeah, see footnotes 221–28 and accompanying text.
236
Mark L. Rienzi, Smith, Stormans, and the Future of Free Exercise: Applying the Free Exercise
Clause to Targeted Laws of General Applicability, 10 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS
143, 145 (2009).
237
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1148 (10th Cir. 2013) (Hartz, J.,
concurring) (discussing the Court’s analysis of the Free Exercise of religion in Braunfeld v. Brown, 366
U.S. 599 (1961) and United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982)).
238
Id.
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Moreover, there is no doubt that the Free Exercise protections extend to
associations like churches that choose to incorporate.239 Therefore, the
rationality of the line that the ACA draws between for-profit corporations
and qualified non-profit corporations for enforcement purposes is
questionable.
It cannot be that the state-sanctioned corporate form, and the limited
liability and lower tax rates that go with it, are at the root of the distinction,
because “[r]eligious associations can incorporate, gain those protections,
and nonetheless retain their Free Exercise rights.”240 Neither the executive
branch nor the judiciary is in a position to distinguish between the sincerity
or validity of forms of evangelism that involve profit-making activities and
those that do not.241 Such distinctions would seem to “take[] us down a
rabbit hole where religious rights are determined by the tax code, with nonprofit corporations able to express religious sentiments while for-profit
corporations and their owners are told that business is business and faith is
irrelevant.”242 Given the relatively arbitrary nature of such distinctions, it
could be that the ACA is subject to attack as under-inclusive under the test
as applied in Hialeah.
2. “It shall be the people.”243
Further, the issue under the Smith standard is not so much whether
there is a burden on religious belief, but the manner in which the burden was
created in the first place. 244 At the end of his Boerne concurrence, Justice
Scalia noted that Free Exercise considerations ultimately boil down to
concrete cases in which decisions must be made about the degree to which
laws passed for the common good may infringe upon the burden of Free
Exercise rights of a group of individuals.245 In eschewing the balancing test
put forward in Sherbert, he argued that the foundation of the Smith standard
is that the people, through their elected representatives, should be making
decisions about these tradeoffs, not the unelected members of the Supreme
Court.246 These sentiments were echoed in the recent opinion written by
Chief Justice John Roberts upholding the Individual Mandate of the ACA:
“[the Individual Mandate] may reasonably be characterized as a tax.
Because the Constitution permits such a tax, it is not [the Supreme Court’s]
239
Id. at 1134 (majority opinion) (noting that the church in Hialeah was a not-for-profit corporation
organized under Florida law).
240
Id. at 1135.
241
Id.; see also Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 706–
07 (2012); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715–16 (1981).
242
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of the United States Dep’t Health and Human Servs.,
724 F.3d 377, 390 (Jordan, J., dissenting).
243
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 544 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring).
244
Id.
245
Id.
246
Id.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol39/iss1/6

2013]

CONTRACEPTION AND CORPORATE PERSONHOOD

169

role to forbid it, or to pass upon its wisdom or fairness.”247
Under the logic of Smith, the fact that the ACA was passed by both
chambers of Congress and signed by the President would seem to suggest
that the proper branches were involved in making the tradeoff decisions.248
However, the specific preventive services to be provided under the
Employer Mandate—i.e., the various forms of sterilization and
contraception—were not enumerated in the legislation itself.249 Rather, the
preventive services were specified in guidelines issued by an executive
agency, the HRSA, and based upon a report by the Institute of Medicine.250
While such discrepancy may not rise to the level of constitutional grounds to
strike down the law, it certainly raises questions for future legislation.
3. The Distinction Between Restriction and Coercion
Finally, the trouble with a strict application of the Smith standard to
the Employer Mandate cases is that it dealt with restrictions on conduct that
constituted the exercise of the plaintiff’s religion. Smith dealt with Oregon
state laws that prohibit the ingestion of peyote,251 and Hialeah dealt with
ordinances of the City of Hialeah that prohibited conduct particular to the
Santeria religion.252 Neither of these foundational Free Exercise cases under
the Smith regime dealt with any form of coercion to violate one’s religious
beliefs. Yet as the Seventh Circuit has noted, “[t]he religious-liberty
violation at issue here inheres in the coerced coverage of contraception,
abortifacients, sterilization, and related services . . . not only . . . in [their]
later purchase or use . . . .”253 It is by no means clear that the same logic that
applied in Smith and Hialeah would apply equally well to cases of coercion.
In distinguishing Sherbert, the Smith Court placed a heavy emphasis
on the fact that the Oregon laws were “across-the-board criminal
prohibition[s] on a particular form of conduct[,]”254 and noted that the
Sherbert test had never been used to invalidate any such prohibitions other
than denial of unemployment compensation.255 Yet the Employer Mandate
obviously is not a prohibition, but a specific directive to action. Smith is
silent on such directives, but history reveals the government must meet a
very high threshold to justify invading the realm of religious belief.256
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For example, there were two Sherbert-era cases in which the Court
applied the balancing test and found that the government interest was found
to be compelling enough to justify burdens on religious conduct.257 Both of
these cases involved the coercion of the plaintiffs to participate in the Social
Security system.258 Yet the Court made very clear that the only reason it
found for the government was because the plaintiffs were taking on the
Social Security system, an entity that the government could not afford to
have jeopardized because too much was already invested.259 The State has
far less invested in the ACA and the Employer Mandate, as the law is still
being phased in.260 The equities certainly seem to stack up differently for
the Employer Mandate.
C. Applying the RFRA Standard
Furthermore, there is little question that the Employer Mandate
burdens the religious belief of employers, thus invoking the heightened
scrutiny required by RFRA.261 Indeed, the Employer Mandate seems open
to challenge on both components of this heightened scrutiny: it is not clear
that the Mandate serves a compelling government interest, nor that it is the
least restrictive means available to further that interest.
The Obama Administration argues the Employer Mandate furthers
the compelling interest of promoting women’s health and reducing the
inequity in health-care costs between men and women.262 However, the test
adopted by RFRA requires the Court to look “beyond broadly formulated
interests justifying the general applicability of government mandates and
[scrutinize] the asserted harm of granting specific exemptions to particular .
. . claimants.”263 That is, the Administration must not only present the broad
interests of promoting women’s health and reducing cost imbalances, it must
show how allowing an exemption for corporations that object would harm
the interest. At least one circuit court has expressed skepticism about the
damage to the Administration’s overall goals that could be done by a
minority of objecting corporations.264 Moreover, there is more than a fair
degree of evidence that the preventive services involved in the Employer

257
See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 254–55 (1982); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 695–96
(1986).
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Lee, 455 U.S. at 261.
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See, e.g., Louise Radnofsky, Health Law Penalties Delayed, WALL ST. J. (July 3, 2013, 9:55 AM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324436104578582082787214660.html (reporting that
the Obama Administration has decided not to implement the penalties provisions of the ACA until 2014).
261
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103–141, § 6, 107 Stat. 1488, 1489.
262
Administration’s Memo, supra note 13 at 21–22.
263
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 431 (2006).
264
Legatus v. Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d 980, 988 (2012). “Considering this in the context of a
United States population of more than 311 million, an exemption for a few hundred seems a miniscule
hindrance to whatever interest . . . the Government may seek to advance.” Id. at 994.
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Mandate are not in the best interest of women or the country.265
Nor will the Administration likely be able to demonstrate that this is
the least restrictive means to further its interest on a theory of the “slippery
slope.” In rejecting a similar argument, the O Centro Court scoffed that it is
“the classic rejoinder of bureaucrats throughout history: If I make an
exception for you, I’ll have to make one for everybody, so no exceptions.”266
Further, the Court noted that it had recently reaffirmed “the feasibility of
case-by-case consideration of religious exemptions to generally applicable
rules.”267 Indeed, the feasibility of case-by-case review of exemptions for
the Employer Mandate would seem to be relatively strong, given both the
exemptions that the Administration has allowed for religious corporations,
and the temporary safe harbor it created for qualifying objectors.268 It is not
clear, in such a situation, why the government could not carefully consider
whether its interest in the goals of the ACA outweighs the burdens on Free
Exercise that it is imposing.
VI. CONCLUSION
On December 26, 2012, Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor
issued an in-chambers opinion to affirm a lower court’s denial of injunctive
relief in the case of Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius.269 Hobby Lobby, an arts and
crafts retail chain with more than 500 stores and 13,000 employees
nationwide,270 had appealed to the Tenth Circuit,271 and then to Justice
Sotomayor,272 after injunctive relief was denied by the district court in the
Western District of Oklahoma. The district court reached its decision in part
from its conclusion that Hobby Lobby failed to demonstrate a probability of
success on its claims because, as a secular, for-profit corporation, it does not
have Free Exercise rights.273
In affirming the district court’s decision to deny relief, however,
Justice Sotomayor declined to affirm its conclusion regarding corporations
265

See, e.g., Brief for Women Speak for Themselves, as Amicus Curiae Supporting PlaintiffsAppellants at 9–12, Wheaton Coll. v. Sebelius, 887 F. Supp. 2d 102 (2012) (Nos. 12-5273, 12-5291),
2012 WL 4842927.
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See supra notes 52 and 56 and accompanying text.
269
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. 641, 642 (2012) (Sotomayor, Circuit Justice).
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Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1284 (W.D. Okla. 2012), rev’d, 723
F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013).
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Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 12-6294, 2012 WL 6930302, at *1–2 (10th Cir. Dec.
20, 2012).
272
28 U.S.C. § 42 (2006) (“The Chief Justice of the United States and the associate justices of the
Supreme Court shall from time to time be allotted as circuit justices among the circuits [of the federal
courts of appeals] . . . .”). The Justices’ powers as Circuit Justice are relatively limited: “[a]part from
granting stays, arranging bails, and providing for other ancillary relief, an individual Justice of the
Supreme Court has no power to dispose of cases on their merits.” 5 AM. JUR. 2d Appellate Review § 381
(2007) (citing Locks v. Commanding General, Sixth Army, 89 S. Ct. 31, 32 (1968)).
273
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 2d at 1287–88.
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and Free Exercise rights. 274 Instead, she simply noted that the Supreme
Court “has not previously addressed similar . . . free exercise claims brought
by closely held for-profit corporations . . . . [L]ower courts have diverged on
whether to grant temporary injunctive relief to similarly situated plaintiffs
raising similar claims . . . and no court has issued a final decision granting
permanent relief with respect to such claims.”275
Indeed, there has been a broad divergence of opinion by the lower
courts in deciding these cases. Some courts have avoided the question
altogether. Other courts have found that the corporations had standing to
assert the First Amendment rights of its owners on a “pass-through
instrumentality theory.” Still other courts have found the for-profit
corporations do not have Free Exercise rights, and at least one court has
decided that there is a “reasonable likelihood” that they do. Soon, however,
the Supreme Court will have to decide one way or the other.
In doing so, it must give serious consideration to Judge Kane’s
questions. Can a corporation exercise religion? Should a closely-held
corporation be treated differently than a publicly-held corporation? Most
importantly, if a corporation can exercise religion, do the severe financial
penalties imposed by the Employer Mandate unduly impede the exercise of
religion of those corporations who refuse to comply on religious grounds?
This comment argues that they do.
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Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 643.
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